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The
RICIS
Concept
The University of Houston-Clear Lake established the Research Institute for
Computing and Information systems in 1986 to encourage NASA Johnson Space
Center and local industry to actively support research in the computing and
information sciences. As part of this endeavor, UH-Clear Lake proposed a
partnership with JSC to jointly define and manage an integrated program of research
in advanced data processing technology needed for JSC's main missions, including
administrative, engineering and science responsibilities. JSC agreed and entered into
a three-year cooperative agreement with UH-Ciear Lake beginning in May, 1986, to
jointly plan and execute such research through RICIS. Additionally, under
Cooperative Agreement NCC 9-16, computing and educational facilities are shared
by the two institutions to conduct the research.
The mission of RICIS is to conduct, coordinate and disseminate research on
computing and information systems among researchers, sponsors and users from
UH-Clear Lake, NASA/JSC, and other research organizations. Within UH-Clear
Lake, the mission is being implemented through interdisciplinary involvement of
faculty and students from each of the four schools: Business, Education, Human
Sciences and Humanities, and Natural and Applied Sciences.
Other research organizations are involved via the "gateway" concept. UH-Clear
Lake establishes relationships with other universities and research organizations,
having common research interests, to provide additional sources of expertise to
conduct needed research.
A major role of RICIS is to find the best match of sponsors, researchers and
research objectives to advance knowledge in the computing and information
sciences. Working jointly with NASA/JSC, RICIS advises on research needs,
recommends principals for conducting the research, provides technical and
administrative support to coordinate the research, and integrates technical results
into the cooperative goals of UH-Clear Lake and NASA/JSC.
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Preface
This research was conducted under auspices of the Research Institute for
Computing and Information Systems by Dr. Rodney L. Bown, Associate Professor of
Computer Systems Design at the University of Houston-Clear Lake. Dr. Bown also
served as RICIS research coordinator.
Funding has been provided by the Engineering Directorate, NASA/JSC through
Cooperative Agreement NCC 9-16 between NASA Johnson Space Center and the
University of Houston-Clear Lake. The NASA technical monitor for this activity was
William C. Young, of the Project Integration Office, Flight Data Systems Division,
Engineering Directorate, NASA/JSC.
The views and conclusions contained in this report are those of the author and
should not be interpreted as representative of the official policies, either express or
implied, of NASA or the United States Government.
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Non-Developmental Item Computer Systems
and the Malicious Software Threat
i. Introduction
In 1985 the Department of Defense (DOD) published the Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria which is commonly called the
"Orange Book" [DOD85]. This document establishes an evaluation
criteria for judging the security properties of a computer
system. Non-DOD computer users were quick to comment that the
document does not provide any criteria to evaluate integrity or
assurance of service properties. In spite of all its criticism,
the Orange book has true value in that it provided an official
set of security requirements for the design of secure systems.
Until recently, the Orange book indicates that the DOD has been
willing to pay for the development of unique trustedcomputer
systems to satisfy a high level of security. In addition, there
have been several industrial efforts to design secure computer
systems, Examples include but are not limited to an A1 level DEC
VMS (not a commercial product), B2 level UNIX System V by AT&T,
third party RACF and Top Secret software for IBM systems, and
Secure ZENIX.
Reduced procurement budgets have now forced DOD and other
government agencies to purchase non-developmental item (NDI)
computer systems. These systems have not been design to satisfy
any official set of security, integrity, and assurance of service
(SI&A) requirements. This policy will increase the risk of using
computer systems to support command and control functions. This
is at time when the National Research Council has issue a report
titled "Computers at Risk" [CLAR90]. The executive summary of
this report states "Without more responsible design and use,
systems disruptions will increase, with harmful consequences to
society."
This paper reviews the context of NDI computer systems with
respect to the malicious software threat and presents a set of
post delivery criteria that an organization should establish in
order to enhance the SI&A characteristics of NDI computer
systems.
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2. A DOD Developed System: The Arm X Secure Operatinq System
Computer systems have become critical components within DOD
command and control systems. These systems require a high level
of trust when used to command and control life and property
resources. T_e requirement for trust usually exceeds the
capabilities provided by most commercial computer systems. To
meet this high level of trust, the DOD has procured unique
computer systems in accordance with standards such as DOD-STD-
2167/2167A [DOD88] and the Trusted Computer Assurance Criteria
[DOD85]. This has required DOD to pay for the high development
cost of these unique computer systems with no financial return of
investment. The return on investment is restricted to the user's
confidence that the system meets a unique set of high level
military criteria for trust.
One such example is the development history of the Army Secure
Operating System (ASOS). Three technical papers on ASOS were
presented at the IEEE Computer Security and Privacy Conference in
Oakland during May 1990 [WALD90], [DiVIg0a], [DiVI90b]. As part
of a software procurement, a DOD agency usually provides funds
for the development of software tools that are associated with
the procured system. Ownership of the tool development supports
additional trust of the system. Reference [DiVIg0b] describes
the development of a knowledge based tool to support the formal
verification of ASOS.
In early 1990, these papers indicated that ASOS is a technical
success and that the system was being delivered to the U. S. Army
for active use by appropriate units. Recent discussions have
indicated that ASOS will not be deployed as originally intended
due to its high cost and narrow application domain [HOFFg0],
[ARMYgO]. These discussions have indicated the standard Army
operating system will be a NDI POSIX compatible UNIX like system.
ASOS has provided another example of the procurement dilemma
faced by government agencies such as NASA and DOD. These
agencies have unique high level requirements that are not
satisfied by commercial general purpose products. The 1980-90
computer system procurement decade has indicated that agencies
such as DOD and NASA can not influence the general purpose
computer market. These agencies must pay for the development of
unique systems or they must modify their procurement criteria to
match the availability of general purpose commercial systems. In
order to reduce the risk of using NDI computer systems, these
agencies must move their high level requirements from the
procurement phase to the post delivery phase. During the post
delivery phase the agency must support the design, development,
or procurement of enhancements to the baseline delivered system.
2
3. Non-Developmental Commercial Computer Systems
Commercial computer vendors design general purpose systems that
are meant to generate a wide based market response sufficient to
recover their development costs through the delivery price of the
system. Similar to government agencies, individual commercial
customers can not influence the design of computer systems unless
they are willing to pay for a major share of the development
costs. The result is that each customer must purchase a NDI
system from a trusted vendor, and then tailor the system to the
unique requirements of the enterprise.
Commercial customers are primarily interested in two
characteristics of computer systems: functionality and
performance. Based on a risk analysis some customers have been
willing to pay for assurance of service i.e. fault tolerant
systems. In many systems, assurance of service is not part of
the design criteria for the system. The Digital Equipment
Corporation has sold more VAX systems without fault tolerance
than has the Tandem corporation sold systems with fault
tolerance. Tandem has made a market penetration into narrow
application domains such as on-line banking and medical systems.
Customers of general purpose commercial systems, are not
concerned about the heritage of the design and development tools
used by the vendor. Many of these tools can be classified as
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) tools that have a poor software
engineering heritage. The customer is forced to rely upon the
market place to provide consensus opinions about the trusted use
of COTS software and hardware design tools used within the pre-
delivery development phase of commercial systems. There is no
authorized governmental or industrial agency that provides
oversight and licensing of commercial computer systems.
There are significant counter examples within other technical
disciplines that can impact the health and welfare of the general
populace. Commercial aircraft must be designed and manufactured
in accordance with stringent FAA standards. Automobiles must
satisfy criteria established by the National Transportation
Safety Board. Electrical appliances must satisfy criteria
published by the Underwriters Industrial Laboratories (UIL).
4. Security, Inteqrity, and Assurance of Service (SI&A)
The majority of commercial customers have been unwilling to pay
an up front premium delivery price for SI&A if it means that
there will be decrease in functionality and performance. UNIX
like systems have demonstrated adequate support for the general
requirements of functionality and performance on modern general
purpose computer systems. Commercial customers are willing to
purchase UNIX based operating systems with known security and
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integrity discrepancies in order to obtain the functionality of
the system.
If the customer identifies a need for SI&A, a set of individual
and unrelated modifications and enhancements will be made to the
system after its delivery. The installed system within each
enterprise will then evolve along a unique modification path.
Each enterprise will be required to maintain tight configuration
management control over their unique computer system. When the
vendor releases a new version of the baseline system, each
enterprise will be required to revalidate the SI&A
characteristics of the new system with the unique set of local
SI&A components.
When NDI systems are procured for SI&A applications, there is a
need to identify all COTS tools that were used in the design and
development of the system. COTS tools are a potential source of
malicious software. These tools should be purchased along with
the system. The tools can then be examined to detect the
presence of hidden malicious software. In addition the tools can
be executed with a set of test software and data. The tools then
become part of the total system configuration management plan.
5. Post Delivery SI&A and Malicious Software
In the last few years, the threat of malicious software has
caused many commercial customers to be concerned about the SI&A
of their installed computer systems. The SI&A of the system is
usually provided by "after delivery procurement" of duplicate
and/or backup systems, security policies and procedures,
resetting of default parameters and passwords, and piece wise
installation of security hardware and software components.
When the customer is unwilling to pay for the development of
unique high performance systems that support SI&A, the customer
is forced to move the SI&A criteria to the post delivery phase.
The nature of the commercial post delivery phase is different
from a typical DOD-STD-2167/2167A procurement phase.
The primary difference is related to the responsibility for
configuration management through out the life cycle. If an
organization or agency has paid for a computer system, it will
have ownership of the system. Through out the life cycle, a
configuration management contractor can maintain the consistency
of all installed systems. New malicious software threats may
negate the current SI&A protection mechanisms. The response to
the new threat will require modification and/or enhancements to
the system. The agency has the authority to authorize and
monitor all prevention and detection enhancements and
modifications to the system.
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The operator of an NDI computer system does not have ownership of
the development process. The life cycle configuration management
of an NDI computer system is under dual and possibly conflicting
control of a set of customers and the computer system vendor.
The customers must respond to two parallel events that will cause
a revalidation of the SI&A characteristic of the system.
The first event is the caused by the vendor's desire to modify
the baseline system in response to the perceived needs of a
general purpose market. The vendor will release new versions of
the baseline system that may contain internal modifications that
are incompatible with the customer's locally enhanced system.
The customer will have to upgrade his baseline system and then
revalidate the SI&A characteristics of the local system.
An example of this configuration management problem is related to
device drivers and third party vendors of secure devices. A new
version of the computer system may include changes to device
drivers and to the vendor's own produced devices. If the
customer is using devices developed by third party vendors, there
may be incompatible interfaces between the device driver and the
device. There may be an unacceptable time delay until the third
party device vendor is able to release an upgrade kit.
The second event is caused by the need to respond to the threat
of new malicious software. This will require modification to the
SI&A mechanisms. The customer will be required to carefully
manage the SI&A revalidation process with two independently
moving targets: system versions and malicious software
prevention mechanisms. The dilemma is that the customer must
choose between three new configurations as summarized below:
baseline: system version 0
possible new configurations:
configuration I: system version 0
configuration 2: system version 1
configuration 3: system version 1
with SI&A version 0
with SI&A version 1
with SI&A version 0
with SI&A version 1
The maintenance of accurate documentation is closely related to
the complexity of configuration management. The customer will be
required to maintain the computer system documents, SI&A system
documents, and a locally developed interface control document
(ICD). When a new version of the baseline system is released,
the customer will have to update the local ICD. Any updates to
the SI&A components will require additional modifications to the
ICD document. Each locally developed ICD will exhibit unique
documentation standards and quality. This will decrease the
portability of technical individuals between system sites.
An industrial supported user's group could provide the mechanism
to establish consistent ICD's. The user's group would have to be
established with a mandate to establish criteria to establish and
monitor ICD's. This would required substantial finding support.
6. Computer System Unique Attributes
An NDI procurement policy has moved the implementation of unique
computer system attributes from the design and development phase
to the post delivery phase. During development, all unique
attributes are controlled by software engineering paradigms
supported by accurate documentation of the system requirements,
specifications, and design. An example is the documentation
requirements specified by DOD-STD-2167/2167A. This provides
confidence that the delivered system will be a high fidelity
implementation of the design documents. When a mismatch between
design and implementation is observed, a discrepancy report (DR)
or software change request (SCR) will be created. The set of
DR's and SCR's form an addendum to the design documents that
initiate a new iteration of the software life cycle.
The post delivery phase of an NDI system has a different set of
constraints that were discussed in the previous section. Here
the control mechanisms are limited to configuration management
paradigms. The vendor's design and development documents may not
be available to the customer. In some cases the vendor may
classify the source code as proprietary. The customer may only
receive the object code supported by a user's manual. In
addition the vendor may claim that any customer modifications
made to the delivered system will negate the warranty.
These issues may require the customer to purchase source code and
design documentation within very tight nondisclosure agreements.
These post delivery issues will increase the cost of a NDI
system. It is pure speculation to estimate the value of the cost
increase factor. It is sufficient to state that NDI procurement
contains additional post delivery costs that must be considered
for each case.
7. Positive Feedback to Com_;cial Computer System Vendors
In the long term, a NDI computer system procurement policy may
promote an improvement in the commercial market for SI&A. As the
trust of each NDI computer system is enhanced by individual
customers, the original vendor may be motivated to include the
enhancements in future versions of the baseline system. The
vendor holds the rationale and knowledge of the system design.
The vendor should be able to incorporate SI&A enhancements within
a system context using all proper software engineering paradigms
and procedures. All organizations should encourage all NDI
vendors to critique third party SI&A mechanisms for potential
incorporation into future versions of the baseline system.
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8. NDI Computers and Software
Software safety has become an additional issue within the context
of trusted computer systems. Susan Gerhart of MCC, Austin, Texas
provided a review of Formal Methods for Trustworthy Systems at
the RICIS'90 Symposium [GERH90]. The point to be observed within
the context of this paper is that formal methods have not been
used to design and develop known NDI computer systems. It is
conceivable that a limited use of formal methods could be applied
during a post delivery re-engineering effort of discrete SI&A
components.
Another issue is the academic training and licensing efforts
related to life and property computer systems. There are
substantial efforts in the United Kingdom and European
communities to enforce a licensing paradigm for software
practitioners that are developing life and property critical
systems. If an organization plans to use an NDI computer system
to control life and property, the licensing paradigm must be
addressed during the post delivery re-engineering effort.
9. Summary and Recommendations
In summary it must be understood the a NDI procurement policy
will increase the risk of using computer systems to support life
and property critical functions. This risk can be reduced by
establishing a set of post delivery trusted computer criteria.
This paper has discussed the issues and rationale related to
developing a set of NDI post delivery criteria for life and
property critical computer systems. A proposed set of criteria
is listed on the next three pages.
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CRITERIA
NDI Post Delivery Criteria to EnhaDce the Security, _ and
Assurance of Service for Command and Control ComDuter Systems
NDI:
SI&A:
ICD:
COTS:
Non Developmental Item
Security, Integrity, and Assurance of Service
Interface Control Document
Commercial Off The Shelf
i. A quantitative SI&A risk analysis shall be applied to each
NDI procurement of command and control computer systems.
Rationale: There is a need to determine the risk of using a
NDI computer system to support a command and control
computer system. The result of the quantitative risk
analysis will provide guidance to estimate the budget
required to support specified post delivery SI&A activities.
• A post delivery SI&A configuration management plan shall be
developed for each NDI computer system.
Rationale: This plan is needed to determine the resources
necessary to provide post delivery SI&A support for the NDI
system.
• A post delivery SI&A budget shall be developed to support
post delivery activities.
Rationale: This plan is needed to determine the estimated
cost of post delivery SI&A activities. The cost estimate
should consider the cost of materials, personnel, and
training.
• A separate NDI computer system shall be procured to
establish a configuration management facility to support the
design/procurement and testing of all post delivery
modifications to the installed systems•
Rationale: NDI procurement policy must provide for the
establishment of a facility to support verification and
validation (V&V) activities related to post delivery
modifications.
$
•e
•
8A.
8B.
For each post delivery modification to the NDI system, an
ICD shall be created and maintained by the organization
responsible for the configuration control facility cited in
4 above.
Rationale: The V&V facility will be used to support in
house activities to enhance the SI&A of the NDI system and
the validation of the ICD.
All COTS tools used to develop the NDI system shall be
procured and maintained by the organization responsible for
the configuration control system cited in 4 above.
Rationale: COTS tools are a potential source of malicious
software. This is necessary to verify the trust of all COTS
design tools.
NDI computer systems shall be procured with warranties that
permit controlled modification by the procuring agency.
Rationale: It is assumed that SI&A enhancements will be
necessary during the post delivery phase of the computer
systems. These enhancements should not negate normal
warranty conditions of the baseline system.
The NDI computer shall be delivered with detailed
documentation that is sufficient to provide guidance to non-
vendor post delivery SI&A design, and test activities.
Rationale: It is assumed that in agency organizations or
third party vendors will be the source of mechanisms that
will be installed to enhance the SI&A of the computer
system. Detailed documentation is required to support the
design and test activities of these non-vendor
organizations. When the vendor releases a new version of
the baseline system, the agency will be required to
revalidate the trust of all non-vendor mechanisms• Detailed
documentation is required to support the revalidation
activity.
(Alternative or in partial addition to 8A) The NDI vendor
shall designate and provide access to a stand alone
duplicate computer system in order to validate in agency
and/or third party SI&A mechanisms.
Rationale: The NDI vendor may withhold some detailed design
documentation based on competitive considerations for
proprietary information. The vendor has the right to
protect proprietary data. A vendor controlled computer
system should then be provided to support test and
validation activities for non-vendor SI&A mechanisms.
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. Post Delivery Re-Engineering Effort
The customer shall provide a re-engineering effort to apply
formal methods to SI&A components. This effort must be
accomplished by licensed practitioners. This should be done
with the support from the NDI vendor or a user's group.
Rationale: This effort will provide a baseline for an
investment in efforts related to application of formal
methods by licensed practitioners.
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